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I.

INTRODUCTION

In the United States of America, our Chief Executive is not selected
by the people, he—or someday she—is elected by electors, through the
Electoral College system. 1 Under this system, electors, or special designees
appointed under state law, vote for their choice of President. 2 Each elector
may cast two votes, one for the President and one for the Vice President.3 In
most states, a winner take all system is used to select electors so that the
*
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1.
What Is the Electoral College?, NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN.:
U.S. ELECTORAL C., http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/about.html
(last visited May 1, 2019).
2.
Id.
3.
Id. Some states require electors to pledge that they will vote for the party
that appointed them. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 215, 227 (1952). Such a requirement is
constitutional. Id. at 231.
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political party that wins the majority of individual votes in that state gets to
appoint all of the electors that will vote for the President—though in Maine
and Nebraska electors are decided on a pro rata basis.4 With rare exception,
electors vote along party lines and in some states they are prohibited from
voting against the candidate who did not receive the majority of votes. 5
The number of electors in each state is based on the number of
representatives and senators allocated to it. 6 This is based on the population
of that state during the United States Census, and each state has a minimum
number of votes, regardless of its population. 7 There are a total of 538
Electoral College votes and a presidential candidate must receive 270
Electoral College votes to win the election.8 Thus, under the Electoral
College system, the President’s selection is not by a popular vote, but is
based on an antiquated system that dates back to the country’s founding. 9
Because the Electoral College system can result in inequity with respect to
the election of a President, between 1889 and 2004, 595 amendments were
proposed on the topic of Electoral College reform—which means that more
proposed constitutional amendments have been introduced regarding
Electoral College reform than on any other subject. 10
In 2016, President Donald J. Trump received 62,984,825 votes—
which is nearly three million votes less than his opponent, Hillary Clinton,

4.
Jonah Engel Bromwich, How Does the Electoral College Work?, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/us/politics/how-does-theelectoral-college-work.html; What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
5.
See THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32611, THE
ELECTORAL COLLEGE: HOW IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 8 (2017).
In the 2016 election, seven electors voted for candidates other than those chosen by their
state’s voters in the popular election. Id. at 9. There have been a total of eight electors who
did not vote for the presidential candidate selected by their party prior to 2008. David
Strömberg, How the Electoral College Influences Campaigns and Policy: The Probability of
Being Florida, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 769, 772 n.7 (2008).
6.
What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
7.
Bromwich, supra note 4.
8.
Id.; What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
9.
What Is the Electoral College?, supra note 1.
10.
L. PAIGE WHITAKER & THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL30804, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS 17
(2004). However, “no proposal to reform the [E]lectoral [C]ollege has been introduced since
the 107th Congress (2001–2003).” THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43824,
ELECTORAL COLLEGE REFORM: CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 20 (2017). “[T]he
candidate who got the most votes won every election from 1896 to 1996.” America’s
Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats, ECONOMIST (July 12,
2018), http://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/12/americas-electoral-system-gives-therepublicans-advantages-over-democrats.
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who received 65,853,516 votes—yet won the election. 11 President Trump
won because he received 74 more votes from the Electoral College than his
opponent. 12 President Trump was elected, notwithstanding the will of the
majority of voting citizens.13 This result, in addition to the 2000 presidential
election, demonstrates why the Electoral College no longer serves a
legitimate purpose. 14 As a result of the most recent election, four proposals
to “replace the [E]lectoral [C]ollege with direct popular election” were
introduced, but no action beyond committee referral was taken on them. 15
Two resolutions proposing a constitutional amendment to establish a direct
popular vote have been introduced to date in the 115th Congress. 16 Such
efforts should be advanced, as the Electoral College cannot be reformed to
ensure one person, one vote, and, like an infected human appendix, it is a
vestige of the past that must be removed before it bursts. 17
II.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

The Articles of Confederation, the predecessor to the United States
Constitution, established an ineffective form of government. 18 As a result of
the inefficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, representatives of the
11.
Presidential
Results,
CNN:
POL.,
http://www.cnn.com/election/2016/results/president (last visited May 1, 2019).
12.
See Tom Kertscher, Despite Losing Popular Vote, Donald Trump Won in
Electoral Landslide, GOP’s Reince Priebus Says, POLITIFACT (Nov. 21, 2016, 5:00 AM),
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/statements/2016/nov/21/reince-priebus/despite-losingpopular-vote-donald-trump-won-elect/#.
13.
Id. “Hillary Clinton’s lead of 2.1 percentage points was larger than those
enjoyed by the victorious John F. Kennedy in 1960, Richard Nixon in 1968, and Jimmy Carter
in 1976.” America’s Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats,
supra note 10.
14.
See id. “[I]n 2000, Bush won by 271 to 266 electoral votes. The margin
was so close that all, and only, the [twenty-eight] states that voted for Bush were decisive in
the Electoral College.” Strömberg, supra note 5, at 786.
15.
NEALE, supra note 10, at 20.
16.
Id.; see also H.R.J. Res. 7, 116th Cong. (2019).
17.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963); Victor Williams & Alison M.
MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its Twelfth Amendment Restatement:
Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77
MARQ. L. REV. 201, 205 (1994); see also Jamelle Bouie, The Electoral College Is the Greatest
Threat
to
Our
Democracy,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
28,
2019),
http://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/28/opinion/the-electoral-college.html.
18.
See Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, U.S CONST.
(Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.usconstitution.net/consttop_ccon.html. James Madison had a
few problems with the Articles of Confederation. Id. “The states were under no obligation to
pay their fair share of the national budget; they violated international treaties with abandon;
they ran roughshod over the authority of the Congress; and they violated each other’s rights
incessantly.” Id.
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states met during the Constitutional Convention to reconfigure the
framework of the United States National Government. 19
James Madison and other Virginian delegates met before the
Constitutional Convention to create the Virginia Plan, which mirrored the
then-existing form of government in Virginia.20 The Virginia Plan called for
“[a] bicameral legislature—two houses.” 21 Both house memberships would
be represented in proportion to each state’s population. 22 The lower house
would be elected by the people, via popular election, and the upper house
would be elected by the lower house. 23 The Virginia Plan also called for the
election of a National Executive through a vote of the members of the lower
house. 24
“The [Virginia] Plan corrected the inequality that the one state, one
vote [or equal state suffrage] notion inflicted upon the large states” by the
Articles of Confederation. 25 However, states could not agree on how to
apportion representation. 26 Smaller states wanted to maintain the status quo
and maintain the equal state suffrage rule of the Articles of Confederation. 27
Larger states viewed the equal state suffrage system as being “inherently
unfair, and were going to do everything they could to abolish it.” 28
19.
Id. “No one seemed to want to debate this issue because of the presence
in the Convention of George Washington, who everyone assumed would be the first [C]hief
[E]xecutive of the nation.” Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College,
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 1151 (2002).
20.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
21.
Id.
22.
Id. In James Madison’s notes on debates in the Federal Convention of
1787, “the rights of suffrage in the [n]ational [l]egislature [were] to be proportioned to the
[q]uotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants.” H.R. Doc. No. 398, at 953
(1927).
23.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
24.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1151. Madison believed that the lower
house should be chosen by popular vote and should therefore have the power to determine the
President. Id. Madison believed that in order to establish a free government, the legislature,
executive, and judiciary powers should be both separately and independently exercised. Id. at
1154–55. He believed an Executive determined by the legislature would form a coalition that
“would be more immediately [and] certainly dangerous to public liberty.” 2 THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 56–57 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966). However,
while he thought the people were the fittest, there would be difficulty in reaching a consensus
because “[t]he people generally could only know [and] vote for some [c]itizen whose merits
had rendered him an object of general attention [and] esteem.” Id. This led to his assertion
that a substitution of electors, in the form of the lower house chosen by popular vote, would be
the best solution. Id. at 57.
25.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
26.
Id.
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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On the other hand, smaller states, such as “New Jersey, New
Hampshire, Maryland, Delaware, Connecticut, and even New York, felt they
had to fear any attempt by the large states of Virginia, Pennsylvania, and
Massachusetts to take away equal [state] suffrage” between the states.29
More importantly, they “feared the Southern [S]tates because of the general
belief . . . that [those states] . . . would soon grow to Pennsylvanian-sized
populations,” and if slaves were counted that those populations would grow
even more quickly. 30
The disagreement over the terms of state representation in the Senate
was hotly contested and there were even “[t]hreats to dissolve the
Convention.” 31 Fortunately, Roger Sherman from Connecticut proposed the
Connecticut Compromise. 32 Sherman sided with the two-house national
legislature of the Virginia Plan but proposed “[t]hat the proportion of
suffrage in the [first] branch, [or House,] should be according to the
respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch, or
Senate, each State should have one vote and no more.” 33 This quelled some
of the tension and led to an eventual agreement. 34 The small states were
steadfast in their stance on “equal suffrage in the Senate.” 35 However, slaveowning states were not willing to agree to such a system unless they could
maintain political power derived from slave ownership. 36 As Madison
observed: “It seemed now to be pretty well understood that the real
difference[s] . . . lay, not between the large [and] small [states], but between
the [Northern and Southern] States. The institution of slavery [and] its
consequences formed the line of discrimination.” 37
29.
Id.
30.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
31.
Id. “[T]he Delaware delegation [was] instructed to leave the Convention
if equal suffrage in the legislature was compromised.” Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
See Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
35.
Id.
36.
See id.
37.
Williams & MacDonald, supra note 17, at 208 (quoting JAMES MADISON,
NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 295 (1976)). “[M]any of the
largest slave holders in the United States were at the Convention.” Constitutional Topic: The
Constitutional Convention, supra note 18. At least a third of the Convention’s fifty-five
delegates owned slaves, including all of the delegates from Virginia and South Carolina.
DAVID O. STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787: THE MEN WHO INVENTED THE CONSTITUTION 68
(2007). “But [Madison] contended that the [s]tates were divided into different interests not by
their difference of size, but by other circumstances; the most material of which resulted partly
from climate, but principally from the effects of their having or not having slaves.” Juan F.
Perea, Race and Constitutional Law Casebooks: Recognizing the Proslavery Constitution,
110 MICH. L. REV. 1123, 1137 (2012) (quoting MADISON, supra, at 224). While the Electoral
College was intended to protect the interests of small states, only three out of the forty-five
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THE THREE-FIFTHS COMPROMISE

In the South, slavery would not only propel the South’s agricultural
economy, but would help fulfill aspirations of “achieving majority control in
the immediate[] foreseeable future.” 38 James Madison had become a
proponent of representation by population, with the inclusion of slaves, prior
to the Convention, and recommended that representation by population “is
recommended . . . to the [S]outhern [States] by their expected superiority.” 39
Nonetheless, Southern delegates feared that they would be divested of
representation as a result of slavery—which was the foundation of the
Southern economy. 40 To protect its interests, “[t]he South wanted their
slaves counted as whole persons [for purposes of allocating representatives],
but that would never happen.” 41
Ultimately, the states were able to reach a compromise on legislative
representation because of issues related to taxation. 42
During the
Convention, delegates proposed that federal tax would be based on the total
population of each state—inclusive of slaves. 43 Southern slave-states
strongly opposed this, as they felt there would be a crippling tax obligation if
slaves were to be counted for purposes of taxes. 44 Slave-owner—and future
beneficiary of the Electoral College 45—Thomas Jefferson maintained such
taxation would be inequitable as Southern States would be taxed “according
to their numbers and their wealth conjunctly, while the [N]orthern [States]
Presidents—Zachary Taylor of Louisiana, Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire, and Bill
Clinton of Arkansas—hailed from them. Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral
College: Past, Present, and Future, 33 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 467, 468 (2007).
38.
GARRY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 58
(2003).

Id. at 54.

Under the Articles, the North outnumbered the South by eight states to
five . . . . Under the Constitution taking shape, . . . [t]he South had to fear an edge
given to the North, both in terms of the unit vote in the Senate and the popular vote
in the House, since [sixty] percent of the white population was in the North.
Counting slaves fully would have made the two regions roughly equal.

39.
Id. at 58.
40.
Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18.
41.
Id.
42.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 53.
43.
Id. at 51. “[T]he three-fifths count was first proposed, in an entirely
different context, as a measure of taxation under the Articles of Confederation, where
representation was not at issue.” Id. at 50–51.
44.
Id. at 51. “The [S]outhern [S]tates, which would be urgent for counting
slaves later on, when it would boost their representation, were opposed to counting them at all
when it boosted taxes. This was, they claimed, taxation without representation.” Id.
45.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 2. Historians Garry Wills, Leonard L.
Richards, and William W. Freehling have written that had slaves not been counted at all,
Adams would have won the electoral vote. Id. at 234 n.2.
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would be taxed on numbers only.” 46 To alleviate the financial burden
associated with slave ownership, reach a compromise, and ensure that the
Southern slave-owning States maintained equal representation, Benjamin
Harrison proposed a one-half ratio so long as slaves were also counted for
purposes of determining representation in the House of Representatives. 47 In
response, several New England delegates proposed a higher three-fourths
ratio. 48 They eventually compromised on the three-fifths ratio proposed by
James Madison. 49
“Counting [slaves] at three-fifths [of a person] would give the South,
which had only [forty-one] percent of the white population, [forty-seven]
percent of the delegates in the House of Representatives.” 50 Indeed, after the
Electoral College was enacted, Pennsylvania, which had ten percent more
free persons than Virginia, had twenty percent fewer representative votes
than its southern counterpart. 51 The Three-Fifths Compromise also delayed
the prohibition of the slave trade in the United States, which guaranteed
Southern political influence through slave-based representation. 52
In exchange for this concession, the federal government’s power to
regulate foreign commerce would be strengthened by provisions that allowed
for taxation of slave trades in the international market.53 This provision only
justified a further increase in the Southern slave population. 54 With the
46.
Id. at 51–52. This is because slaves were viewed as property “comparable
to such property, held in the North, as cattle, horses, etc.” Id. at 51. The authors of this
Article write this piece in part to denounce the fact that the Electoral College was created as a
result of slavery to preserve the power of Southern slave owners. See id.
47.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 53.
48.
Id.

Id.

This was a compromise between the one-half count favored by the South and the
three-fourths favored by the North. It would count a slave’s productivity at [sixty]
percent of a free person’s, as opposed to the [fifty] percent favored by the South or
the [seventy-five] percent desired by the North. Madison split the difference with a
tilt in the South’s favor.

49.
Id.
50.
Id. at 54; see also DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1765–1820, at 179–80 (1979).
51.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Troubling Reason the Electoral College Exists,
TIME: HIST. (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:16 PM), http://www.time.com/4558510/electoral-collegehistory-slavery/.
52.
Martin Kelly, What Does the Constitution Say About Slavery?,
THOUGHTCO.: ISSUES, http://www.thoughtco.com/what-does-constitution-say-about-slavery105417 (last updated Sept. 5, 2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; WILLS, supra note 38, at
54.
53.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 50–51.
54.
See Table, VOYAGES: TRANS-ATLANTIC SLAVE TRADE DATABASE,
http://www.slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates (set row field for individual years, then set
columns field for flag, then set cells field for only disembarked, then select show hyperlink)
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assurance of slavery’s continued and strengthened existence, the South was
provided opportunities to improve their voting power in both Congress and
the Electoral College. 55 This enhanced power would ensure that if the issue
of slavery was revisited, they would undoubtedly have the requisite votes in
Congress and through the Electoral College, which influenced the selection
of the Executive, to preserve it. 56
IV.

ORIGINS OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

On May 25, 1787, James Wilson, a prominent Philadelphia lawyer
and representative from Philadelphia, suggested that the people elect a single
person to act as a National Executive, “giving most energy dispatch and
responsibility to the office.” 57 “The only powers [Wilson] conceived strictly
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not—
appertaining to and—appointed by the [l]egislature.” 58 He further advocated
an election of the Executive by the people, based on a popular election. 59
However, Wilson’s proposal was not accepted by Southern delegates who
wanted the legislature to select the President.60 Among others, “Hugh
(last visited May 1, 2019); Kelly, supra note 52. During the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, there
was a noticeable increase in slaves who disembarked in the United States during this twentyyear period, beginning with 2,083 ships in 1787 and peaking at over 29,675 in the last year,
1807. Table, supra. In fact, from the inception of the Trans-Atlantic slave trade, in 1525 to
1786, a year before the Three-Fifths Compromise, there had been 110,749 slaves who
disembarked in the United States. See id.; Kelly, supra note 52. Unsurprisingly, over the
twenty-year period of 1787–1807, this number increased to 130,961 slaves. Table, supra.
55.
See RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL
DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1793); Results from the 1860 Census, CIV. WAR HOME
PAGE, www.civil-war.net/pages/1860_census.html (last visited May 1, 2019). The slavery
population had grown from 29,264, in 1790, to 3,950,528 in 1860—roughly a 13,500%
increase. RETURN OF THE WHOLE NUMBER OF PERSONS WITHIN THE SEVERAL DISTRICTS OF
THE UNITED STATES, supra, at 3; Results from the 1860 Census, supra. During this period,
“[i]n the [United States], on average, a slave mother gave birth to between nine and [ten]
children . . . . [Expectantly, by] 1860, ‘less than [ten] percent of the slave population was over
[fifty] and only 3.5 percent was over [sixty].’” Henry Louis Gates Jr., Slavery, by the
Numbers, ROOT (Feb. 10, 2014, 12:01 AM), http://www.theroot.com/slavery-by-the-numbers1790874492.
56.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 50, 58.
57.
William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 912, 947 (2008) (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787, at 65 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966)).
58.
Id. at 947 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 57, at 66).
59.
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at
56.
60.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1153–55. Hugh Williamson of North
Carolina asserted that if a popular election was done, there would be “distinguished characters
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Williamson of North Carolina openly calculated that direct election of the
[E]xecutive would place the South at a clear disadvantage. He reasoned that
because the South’s ‘slaves would have no suffrage’ in a presidential
election, the slave-free [N]orthern [S]tates would have a much greater voter
population in comparison.” 61 As a result, James Wilson “suggested that each
state be divided into ‘districts: [A]nd that the persons qualified to vote in
each district’ vote for ‘[m]embers for their respective [d]istricts to be electors
of the Executive Magistracy.’” 62 This did not obtain much support. 63
However, it laid the foundation for the creation of the Electoral College. 64
In response to Wilson, Charles Pinckney, a South Carolina
representative, claimed that a direct election of the President would result in
the largest states being able to select the President. 65 However, Pinckney’s
issue was not an issue of representation of small or large states: “The issue
here was not population, but the voting population. With about half of South
Carolina populated by slaves, Pinckney could not afford to support the direct
election of the [P]resident because that would [ultimately harm] his state.” 66
Similarly, James Madison, a slaveholder from Virginia, stated that “right of
suffrage was much more diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States;
and the latter could have no influence in the election on the score of the

[such as President George Washington], who [were] known perhaps to almost every man.
This [would] not always be the case.” Id. at 1154 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 32). He thought that eventually people would “vote
for some man in their own [s]tate, and the largest [s]tate will be sure to succeed.” Id. (quoting
2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 24, at 32).
61.
Williams & MacDonald, supra note 17, at 209 (quoting 3 JONATHAN
ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 296 (James McClellan &
M.E. Bradford eds., 2d ed. 1991)).
62.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1153 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 77).
63.
Id. at 1154. “Although a conservative on many issues, [on the question of
how to choose the National Executive, Wilson] proved to be a radical democrat, arguing for
an election by the people, citing the successful experience of the popular election of governors
in New York and Massachusetts . . . .” Id. at 1152 (quoting 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 57, at 68).
64.
See id. at 1153.
65.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1154; Constitutional Topic:
The
Constitutional Convention, supra note 18. Pinckney submitted his proposal on May 29, 1787,
the same day Madison’s Virginia Plan was introduced. Constitutional Topic: The
Constitutional Convention, supra note 18. This position was made clear by Hugh Williamson,
of North Carolina, who was less articulate than Pinckney, when he noted that Southern slave
owners would always wish to vote on behalf of their slaves. Finkelman, supra note 19, at
1154.
66.
Id.
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Negroes.” 67 Ultimately, the concern over slave-derived political power
carried the day, and an election of the Executive by popular vote was
rejected by the Constitutional Convention, with only six or seven delegates
out of forty-two delegates speaking favorably on the issue. 68 This occurred
because, among other reasons, Southern States would not permit their slaves
to vote and be counted towards the election of the Executive, yet slave
owners wanted to exercise political influence through their ownership of
slaves. 69
Ultimately, the Convention agreed to permit the states to select
electors to vote for the Executive. 70 The number of electors allocated to each
state was based on the representation of Congress, provided slave owners
with more power, and had been previously agreed to by the Convention as a
fair mechanism to apportion representation. 71 The Electoral College was
formed, and as one delegate to the Virginia delegation would say, “seems
rather founded on accident than any principle of government I [have] ever
heard of.” 72
V.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF 1800 AND THE FORMATION OF THE
MODERN ELECTORAL COLLEGE

In its original iteration, the candidate who received the most electoral
votes would become the President, and the candidate who received the
second most votes would become the Vice President, and each elector was
permitted to cast two votes, one for President, and one for Vice President. 73
If no candidate received a majority of votes, the decision of who to elect as
President would be left to the House of Representatives, with each state
casting a single vote in favor of their chosen candidate, and the majority of
votes for the House of Representatives would carry the day. 74
The 1796 election laid the foundation for the involvement of
political parties in the Electoral College. 75 Despite the fact that the
67.
Id. at 1154–55 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, supra note 24, at 57).
68.
See Joshua D. Hawley, The Transformative Twelfth Amendment, 55 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1501, 1515 (2014).
69.
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1155.
70.
Id. at 1154–55.
71.
Id.
72.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1520 (quoting 3 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
516 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
73.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
74.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
75.
Sanford Levinson & Ernest A. Young, Who’s Afraid of the Twelfth
Amendment?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 925, 928–29 (2001). Federalists, led by Alexander
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Federalist candidate, John Adams, received a majority of votes, Federalist
electors did not garnish sufficient electoral votes for their intended vice
presidential candidate to become Vice President.76 As a result, Thomas
Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican and John Adams’ opponent in the
election, became the Vice President, and used the position to undermine
Adams’ authority. 77
After learning their lesson from the 1796 election, Federalists and
Republicans were prepared for the 1800 election, and electors from the
different political parties voted for their top two candidates based on party
lines to ensure that the Vice President would not be from a different political
party. 78 However, the electors did not contemplate the fact that unless the
intended presidential candidate received more votes than the vice presidential
candidate, there would be a run-off election in the House of
Representatives. 79 As a result, Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson, two
Republican candidates who received an equal number of electoral votes,
were forced to have a run-off election in the House of Representatives,
which—at the time—was comprised mainly of Federalists. 80
The House of Representatives met for thirty-six hours casting thirtyfive ballots, as Federalist congressmen refused to vote for Jefferson, who
they viewed as an enemy to the Republic, or Burr who they viewed with
equal disdain. 81
The process was viewed with such hostility that
Pennsylvania and Virginia’s governors made preliminary preparations to
mobilize their “states’ militia[s] in the event [that] congressional Federalists
Hamilton, favored a strong central government with the power to control commerce, while
Republicans favored a strong local government with a weak federal government. See id. at
929–30; Hawley, supra note 68, at 1524.
76.
Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 928. At this time, American politics
was dominated by two political parties: The Republicans and the Federalists. Id.; Hawley,
supra note 68, at 1524, 1530.
77.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536; Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at
928–29.
78.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536; Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at
929.
79.
Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 928–29. There are some historical
accounts which indicate that Thomas Jefferson, who presided over the counting of electoral
votes as the Vice President, manipulated the results of the Electoral College to improperly
count certain votes, avoiding a five-person run off. Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana,
Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 614–15 (2004).
80.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536–37. Federalists, on the other hand, were
more coordinated, and one Republican elector voted for John Jay, instead of Charles Pickney.
Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 929 n.16. Republican electors, who were unaware of
how their contemporaries voted, wanted to avoid the results of the 1796 election and all voted
for both Burr and Jefferson. Id. at 1536.
81.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1536–37; Williams & MacDonald, supra note
17, at 215.
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prevented the ascension of one of the Republican [Presidents].” 82 Before a
constitutional crisis could occur, the House of Representatives broke for a
weekend, and after a weekend of “fierce back room politicking and deal
making” the House returned for another vote and Jefferson was elected
President. 83
The Federalist congressmen’s conduct during the 1800 election
created significant concerns as to whether the legislature could usurp the will
of the people through the run-off process originally contemplated in the
Electoral College. 84 As a result, Congress began to discuss a meaningful
reform to the Electoral College, based on the Republican argument that “it
was the right of popular majorities to choose the President.” 85 To effectuate
such a policy, Republicans proposed that votes for the Vice President be cast
separately from those for the President, which consolidated presidential
authority in the executive branch and reduced the possibility of having
elections decided by Congress. 86 Federalists opposed this proposal because
they knew that “they were unlikely to be able to muster a majority of the
electors in the foreseeable future, [and therefore] did their best to preserve
the unholy possibility that they might be able to choose between their
opponents in the House.” 87 In furtherance of their position, Federalists
claimed that tying the Vice President’s duties to those of the President would
result in a Vice President being selected to curry political favor.88

82.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1537.
83.
Williams & MacDonald, supra note 17, at 215. Historians believe that
Alexander Hamilton played a critical role in preventing Aaron Burr from being elected
President. See “Jefferson Is in Every View Less Dangerous than Burr”: Hamilton on the
LEHRMAN
INST.
AM.
HIST.:
HIST.
NOW,
Election
of
1800,
GILDER
http://www.gilderlehrman.org/content/jefferson-every-view-less-dangerous-burr-hamiltonelection-1800 (last visited May 1, 2019). Indeed, Hamilton is quoted as stating:
Mr. Jefferson, though too revolutionary in his notions, is yet a lover of
liberty and will be desirous of something like orderly Government — Mr. Burr
loves nothing but himself — thinks of nothing but his own aggrandizement — and
will be content with nothing short of permanent power [struck: and] in his own
hands — No compact, that he should make with any [struck: other] passion in his
[struck: own] breast except [struck: his] Ambition, could be relied upon by
himself — How then should we be able to rely upon any agreement with him? Mr.
Jefferson, I suspect will not dare much Mr. Burr will [inserted in margin: dare
every thing in the sanguine hope of effecting every thing — ].

Id. (alterations in original).
84.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1540.
85.
Id. at 1543–44.
86.
Id. at 1550–51.
87.
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS
1801-1829, 41 (2001); Levinson & Young, supra note 75, at 930.
88.
See Hawley, supra note 68, at 1552.
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Ultimately, the argument that the President should be a man of the
people carried the day, and the Twelfth Amendment was enacted. 89 The
Twelfth Amendment provided, in relevant part, that each elector could cast
one vote for the President and one vote for the Vice President, and that if no
presidential candidate received the required majority, then the President
would be selected by the House of Representatives and the Vice President
would be selected by the Senate. 90
The Twelfth Amendment transformed the nature of the executive
branch and, thus, the importance of the Electoral College. 91 Because the
Twelfth Amendment eliminated the possibility of having a politically
independent Vice President, it consolidated power for the President by
making it difficult for the Vice President “to establish a compelling identity
apart from the party apparatus,” and prevented any person, aside from the
President, from being the leader of any major political faction within the
President’s party. 92 As a result, the Twelfth Amendment transformed the
way that a President would campaign and act. 93 Because the President’s
power was consolidated, he had the ability to promulgate policy without
interference from an opposition Cabinet. 94 Similarly, presidential elections
became a nationwide spectacle focused solely on the identity of the
presidential candidates, as opposed to the elections of 1796 and 1800, where
vice presidential candidates received some attention. 95
The political power vested in the President through the enactment of
the Twelfth Amendment was not contemplated by delegates at the
Convention, who envisioned an Executive with limited powers of enforcing
legislation of Congress. 96 Had the framers of the Twelfth Amendment
realized that the National Executive would have the independent role that
he—or she—enjoys today, they may not have compromised and agreed to
select the National Executive through the reformed Electoral College system
as proscribed by the Twelfth Amendment. 97
Despite the fact that the Twelfth Amendment was intended to give
the voting population an opportunity to participate in the presidential
election, prevent the trading of political favors for positions in the
President’s Cabinet, and prevent Congress from exercising power over the

XII.

89.
90.

Id. at 1550.
WHITAKER & NEALE, supra note 10, at 5; see also U.S. CONST. amend.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Hawley, supra note 68, at 1501.
Id. at 1560–61.
See id. at 1555.
See id. at 1552.
See id. at 1555.
Hawley, supra note 68, at 1506, 1514, 1528.
See id. at 1506, 1528.
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election of Presidents, it did not serve that purpose. 98 The 1824 election,
which was decided under the deadlock provisions of the Twelfth
Amendment, resulted in the very conduct that the Amendment sought to
prohibit. 99
In 1824, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and Henry Clay all
ran for President and, unlike modern third party candidates, Clay was able to
acquire enough votes to prevent Adams or Jackson from winning the
Electoral College outright, causing the election to go to the House of
Representatives. 100 During the run-off election, Clay, who was disqualified
from consideration as President in the run-off because he did not receive
sufficient votes to qualify, agreed to use his position and influence in the
House of Representatives to help Adams gain enough votes to be elected in
exchange for being appointed as the Secretary of State. 101
Other
representatives traded political favors for votes in the run-off election as well
and, as a result of back room politics, John Quincy Adams won the run-off
election of 1824 without receiving the majority of popular or electoral
votes. 102
VI.

THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT

Despite Congress’s prohibition of importation of slaves in 1808,
slavery continued to grow, increasing the political influence of Southern
States. 103 In 1812, slave states had 76 out of 143 members of the House of
Representatives—instead of the 59 they would have had, but for the ThreeFifths Compromise— and, in 1833, 98 out of 240 instead of 73. 104 In 1820,
slavery continued to expand geographically as the Missouri Compromise
permitted slavery in new territories, so long as they were located below the
Mason-Dixon Line. 105 As a result, Southern proslavery positions dominated
United States policy, and the well-being of Southern interests was preserved
98.
See id. at 1501, 1506–07.
99.
See Jeffery A. Jenkins & Brian A. Sala, The Spatial Theory of Voting and
the Presidential Election of 1824, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1157, 1158–59 (1998). Henry Clay only
won thirty-seven electoral votes. Id. at 1160. There is a dispute as to whether John Quincy
Adams actually offered Clay and other representatives a Cabinet position in exchange for
electoral votes. Id. at 1158; Jamie L. Carson & Erik J. Engstrom, Assessing the Electoral
Connection: Evidence from the Early United States, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 746, 748 (2005).
100.
Jenkins & Sala, supra note 99, at 1157–59. At that time, Jackson had the
majority of popular votes. Id. at 1160.
101.
Id. at 1158–59.
102.
Id. at 1157–58.
103.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 6, 53.
104.
Id.
105.
See John Mackenzie, A Brief History of the Mason-Dixon Line, U. DEL.,
http://www1.udel.edu/johnmack/mason_dixon/ (last visited May 1, 2019).
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through the ability to vote on behalf of slaves, which was only possible
thanks to the Electoral College. 106
Prior to the American Civil War, Southern States gained a
disproportionate representational advantage, compared to Northern free
States. 107
Southern States had a disproportionate influence on the
presidency, the speakership of the House, and the Supreme Court in the
period prior to the Civil War. 108 In fact, “[f]or [thirty-two] of the
Constitution’s first [thirty-six] years, a white slave-holding Virginian
occupied the presidency.” 109
With slavery expanding, which resulted in an increase in the South’s
political power, President Abraham Lincoln and the Republican party 110 did
not have the political ability to not interfere with slavery. 111 Nonetheless,
President Lincoln’s election caused many Southern States to fear that they
would lose the ability to control the Electoral College to maintain their way
of life, and secession from the Union became the alternative. 112
106.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6. “[O]n behalf of white settlers who wanted
to grow cotton on the Indians’ land, the federal government [empowered by President Andrew
Jackson’s Indian Removal Act] forced [the Natives] to leave their homelands and walk
thousands of miles to a specially designated Indian territory across the Mississippi River.”
Trail of Tears, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-of-tears
(last updated Aug. 29, 2018).
107.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6, 53. In 1860, the free population of free
states was 18,807,386 in comparison to the 8,425,812 of the free population in slave-owning
states. See Results from the 1860 Census, supra note 55. Thanks to the Three-Fifths
Compromise, the slave states were able to increase their representation by 2.3 million, which
undoubtedly assisted their influence in the legislature, as only a simple majority is needed to
pass a bill—the first hurdle needed to clear in order to institute or uphold their fundamentally
flawed policies. See WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6; The Legislative Process, U.S. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, http://www.house.gov/the-house-explained/the-legislative-process (last
visited May 1, 2019).
108.
WILLS, supra note 38, at 5–6.
109.
Akhil Reed Amar, The Electoral College, Unfair from Day One, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2000, at A2.
110.
Louise Weinberg, Dredd Scott and the Crisis of 1860, 82 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 97, 109–10, 112 (2007). This is a different Republican party than President Jefferson’s
which transformed itself to the Democratic party. See id.; Alana Horowitz Satlin, Actually,
Lincoln Would Be Horrified by Today’s GOP, HUFFPOST: POL. (Feb. 15, 2016),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/lincoln-modern-gop
republicans_us_56bdea90e4b0b40245c61bb5.
111.
See Alexander Tabarrok & Lee Spector, Would the Borda Count Have
Avoided the Civil War?, 11 J. THEORETICAL POL. 261, 271–72 (1999). President Lincoln was
elected, in part, because he did not campaign against the abolition of slavery. Weinberg,
supra note 110, at 101. Instead, he took the position that he opposed the expansion of slavery
into new states. Id.
112.
Id. at 109–10. Notably, Article II of the Constitution of the Confederate
States of America preserved the Electoral College system of selecting the President of the
Confederacy. CONST. OF CONFEDERATE STS. of 1861, art. II, § 1. In 1861, Jefferson Davis
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Many Republicans believed that slavery was a primary cause of the
Civil War, and believed that for the Union to continue to exist, slavery had to
be eliminated. 113 As a result, and since the Democratic party—which was
comprised primarily of Southern slave owners—was weak in the remaining
Union States because of secession, the Republican party took control of both
houses of Congress in 1862 and drafted an anti-slavery amendment in
1864. 114 After General Robert E. Lee surrendered, 115 the Thirteenth
Amendment, which abolished slavery, was ratified. 116
It has been widely recognized that Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment gave Congress the power to enforce the Amendment by
prohibiting legislation relating to the “badges and incidents of slavery.” 117
The term incident referred to the inability to hold property, testify in court,
enforce the rights of the black man, exercise the right of freedom of speech,
or obtain an education. 118 Although the term badge had a varying meaning
before the Civil War, it generally referred to the skin color of a slave, as only
a man of color could be a slave. 119 By the 1860s, the Supreme Court began
using the terms to refer to a “broader set of political, civil, and legal
disadvantages imposed on slaves, former slaves, and free blacks.” 120
was elected as the President of the Confederacy, receiving 109 out of 109 Confederate
electoral votes. J. CONG. OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AM., S. DOC. NO. 234, at 12 (1904);
Jefferson Davis Elected Confederate President, HIST.: THIS DAY IN HIST.,
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/jefferson-davis-elected-confederate-president (last
updated Feb. 25, 2019).
113.
See Weinberg, supra note 110, at 98.
114.
See Robert Longley, The 13th Amendment: History and Impact,
THOUGHTCO. (Nov. 13, 2018) http://www.thoughtco.com/thirteenth-amendment-4164032;
Leonard M. Scruggs, Passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, TRIBUNEPAPERS (Jan. 10, 2014),
http://www.thetribunepapers.com/2014/01/10/passage-of-the-fourteenth-amendment/.
115.
Robert E. Lee Surrenders, HIST., http://www.history.com/this-day-inhistory/robert-e-lee-surrenders (last updated Feb. 20, 2018). On April 9, 1865,

Id.

Lee and Grant, both holding the highest rank in their respective armies,
had known each other slightly during the Mexican War and exchanged awkward
personal inquiries. Characteristically, Grant arrived in his muddy field uniform
while Lee had turned out in full dress attire, complete with sash and sword. Lee
asked for the terms, and Grant hurriedly wrote them out. All officers and men were
to be pardoned, and they [would] be sent home with their private property — most
important, the horses, which could be used for a late spring planting. Officers
would keep their side arms, and Lee’s starving men would be given Union rations.
Shushing a band that had begun to play in celebration, General Grant
told his officers, “The war is over. The Rebels are our countrymen again.”

116.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Longley, supra note 114.
117.
Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery,
14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 563 (2012); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
118.
McAward, supra note 117, at 572–73.
119.
Id. at 576.
120.
Id. at 578.
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The Electoral College was not successfully challenged as a badge of
slavery. 121 A plausible constitutional challenge based upon the Thirteenth
Amendment may not have been mounted because the Electoral College grew
out of a political compromise to allow Southern slave owners to maintain
political power derived from slave ownership. 122 Constitutional legal
challenges based upon the freshly adopted Thirteenth Amendment after a
devastating and divisive civil war did not occur. 123 It is possible that the
constitutionality of the Electoral College was not contested because the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to remedy the issues created by it, and
because of “skepticism [as to] whether the Thirteenth Amendment itself, in
the absence of congressional legislation,” could be enforced. 124
VII.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

Eliminating slavery had the effect of eliminating the provision that
counted each slave as three-fifths a person for purposes of allocating taxes
and representation. 125 As a result, the former slave states gained fifteen seats
in Congress. 126 However, giving black citizens the right to vote did not
protect them from the imposition of badges of slavery, as the Constitution
did not apply to the states at the time. 127
After President Lincoln was assassinated and Andrew Johnson
became President, many Republicans were concerned that President Johnson
would not ensure that slavery was abolished.128 In the eyes of Republican
leadership, President Johnson was more concerned with keeping the country
together than with ending slavery. 129 To ensure that slavery would be
eliminated before Congress would be flooded by former Confederate States’

121.
See id. at 577–78; Amar, supra note 37, at 471.
122.
Amar, supra note 37, at 470; Christopher F. Petrella, Slavery, Democracy,
and the Racialized Roots of the Electoral College, BLACK PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 14, 2016),
http://www.aaihs.org/slavery-democracy-and-the-racialized-roots-of-the-electoral-college/;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
123.
See Longley, supra note 114.
124.
William M. Carter, Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment:
Defining Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1329 (2007); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Akhil Reed Amar, Becoming Lawyers in the Shadow of Brown,
40 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 7 (2000).
125.
Scruggs, supra note 114; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
126.
See Scruggs, supra note 114.
127.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Scruggs, supra note 114.
128.
See Allen Pusey, The 14th Amendment Is Ratified, 102 A.B.A. J. 72, 72
(2016).
129.
See id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2019

17

Nova Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 2

128

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

representatives, Republicans would take any steps needed to fully abolish
slavery, and sought to enact the Fourteenth Amendment. 130
The Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to ensure that Southern
States would abolish the institution of slavery even if President Johnson and
others were not willing to act.131 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited any state from making or enforcing any law which abridges the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States or “den[ies] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 132 Section 1
was added in order to block state legislation that would attempt to implement
other forms of servitude in order to replace slavery, such as Black Codes.133
To further protect against state interference with black votes in the
presidential election, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
[s]tates according to their respective numbers, counting the whole
number of persons in each [s]tate, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of
a [s]tate, or the members of the [l]egislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such [s]tate, being twenty-one years
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged,
except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such [s]tate. 134

This provision would reduce a state’s representation in Congress and
the Electoral College if the state deprived any adult male citizen of his right
to vote. 135 Supporters of Section 2 argued that language was necessary to

130.
See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
131.
See 14th Amendment, HIST., http://www.history.com/topics/blackhistory/fourteenth-amendment (last updated Aug. 21, 2018); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
132.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 14th Amendment, supra note 131.
133.
14th Amendment, supra note 131; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
134.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; 14th Amendment, supra note 131.
135.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; 14th Amendment, supra note 131.
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allow black men an avenue to effectuate reform and preserve their rights. 136
It did not apply to women or convicted felons. 137
The Southern States, except for Tennessee, rejected the Fourteenth
Amendment. 138 However, readmission into the Union—and, thus, the
eventual elimination of the Northern military presence in the South—was
conditioned on ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
establishment of state constitutions that Congress deemed acceptable. 139
Because ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was a condition to being
readmitted into the Union, Southern States reluctantly agreed to ratify it,
while openly refusing to comply with it.140 The South’s refusal to abide by
the Fourteenth Amendment made it clear that Section 2 would not be
enforced against the former slave holding states, as Northern representatives
quickly realized that Southern States “and their enactment of black codes . . .
made the condition of the freedmen more deplorable than slavery itself[,]” by
criminalizing conduct to limited voting rights and causing former slaves to
incur debts they could not pay, thereby forcing them into indentured
servitude. 141 Moreover, if Section 2 was enforced upon enactment, Northern
States would have lost significant power because they, like their Southern
counterparts, did not permit black citizens to vote. 142

136.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Michael Kent Curtis, The Fourteenth
Amendment: Recalling What the Court Forgot, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 911, 958 (2008).
“Thaddeus Stevens told his colleagues this was the most important provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Curtis, supra, at 958.
137.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 305 (2004); Curtis, supra note 136, at 958.
Significant disenfranchisement of black voters occurred as a result of being convicted of
crimes. Chin, supra, at 305.
138.
Michael Kent Curtis, The Klan, the Congress, and the Court:
Congressional Enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the State Action
Syllogism, a Brief Historical Overview, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1381, 1397 (2009).
139.
Id.
140.
Id.; Chin, supra note 137, at 261.
141.
Chin, supra note 137, at 269 (quoting GEORGE W. JULIAN, POLITICAL
RECOLLECTIONS: 1840 TO 1872 304 (Jansen, McClurg & Co. ed., 1884)); see also Curtis,
supra note 136, at 1387; Floyd D. Weatherspoon, The Mass Incarceration of AfricanAmerican Males: A Return to Institutionalized Slavery, Oppression, and Disenfranchisement
of Constitutional Rights, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 599, 599–600 (2007). These black codes
subjected former slaves to harsher sentencing laws than whites, prohibited voting, restricted
travel, and provided lesser educational opportunities for newly freed slaves. Curtis, supra
note 136, at 917; Weatherspoon, supra, at 599–600.
142.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Curtis, supra note 136, at 917.
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To avoid losing political capital as a result of the failure to grant
blacks the right to vote, Northern representatives relied on the enactment of
the Fifteenth Amendment, which effectively abolished Section 2.143 Indeed,
Courts hold and commentators agree that “instead of prohibiting
race-based voting restrictions, Section 2 merely established a price
for such restrictions.” By contrast, the Fifteenth Amendment
categorically prohibits . . . states from discriminating on the basis
of race; it “has always been treated as self-executing and has
repeatedly been construed, without further legislative
specification, to invalidate state voting qualifications or procedures
which are discriminatory on their face or in practice.” . . . As the
Supreme Court explained in United States v. Reese, 144 before
[enactment of] the Fifteenth Amendment, “[i]t was as much within
the power of a state to exclude citizens of the United States from
voting on [the] account of race, as it was on account of age,
property or education. Now it is not.” 145

As a practical matter, enforcement of Section 2 was rendered
impossible by the Fifteenth Amendment. 146 Once a plaintiff established that
he was deprived of his right to vote by a state’s legislature, the Fifteenth
Amendment mandated that his rights be restored, eliminating the possibility
of a state suffering the consequences built into Section 2. 147
If Section 2 were enforced there would have been severe farreaching consequences such as a state losing representation in Congress, as
well as losing electoral votes for the President. 148 However, Section 2 was
never enforced. 149 Polls taken to determine whether people were losing the
right to vote were inaccurate. 150 As a result, it was impossible to determine
143.
Chin, supra note 137, at 274–75; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2;
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
144.
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
145.
Chin, supra note 137, at 274–75 (alteration in original) (first quoting
Henry L. Chambers, Colorblindness, Race Neutrality, and Voting Rights, 51 EMORY L.J.
1397, 1418 (2002); then quoting Reese, 92 U.S. at 217–18).
146.
Id. at 272. States, without specifically mentioning race, imposed onerous
requirements onto voters, such as a requirement that a voter pass a literacy test, to prevent
former slaves from voting. Arthur Earl Bonfield, The Right to Vote and Judicial Enforcement
of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 108, 108–09 (1960).
147.
Chin, supra note 137, at 263.
148.
Chambers, supra note 145, at 1417; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
2.
149.
Bonfield, supra note 146, at 113; Curtis, supra note 138, at 916.
150.
George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present
Status of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 111 (1961). In
1871, Congress attempted to determine the number of disenfranchised voters, and determined
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the amount of voters that were being disenfranchised. 151 Based on the
holding of Saunders v. Wilkins, 152 individuals were also precluded from
seeking to enforce Section 2 because courts could not address issues related
to the allocation of representatives among several states because such issues
fell within the exclusive purview of the legislature, notwithstanding the plain
language of Section 2. 153
There was no need to enforce Section 2 until 1876, when the North
ended its occupation of the South as part of the agreement to resolve the
1876 Tilden-Hayes presidential election in the House of Representatives, as
the occupying Union army ensured that African Americans were permitted to
exercise their rights. 154 However, once Northern occupation ended, the
South was able to deny blacks the rights the Fourteenth Amendment was
meant to guarantee. 155 Southern States enacted laws, such as poll taxes and
literacy tests, which were intended to prevent blacks from voting, and were
very successful in suppressing the vote, such that in 1954, in Alabama, there
were no registered black voters in nine rural counties with a large black
population. 156
Even until today, African Americans are disproportionately denied
the right to vote because of state laws that prohibit prisoners, parolees, and
ex-felons from voting. 157 These laws, as applied, have caused the
incarceration of a significant number of African American voters and
resulted in their disenfranchisement. 158 Nonetheless, the laws are upheld
under the Fifteenth Amendment because the laws at issue do not discriminate
against a person based on their race, without regard to the fact that they were
accused of violating the law due to their race or other related issues. 159 Had
such laws been analyzed under the context of Section 2, a different result
that in “Southern States, except Texas, the number of adult male citizens who were
disenfranchised amounted to less than 0.5[%].” Id. at 111–12.
151.
See id. at 111. The 42nd Congress attempted to produce a census
reporting the number of disenfranchised citizens and the passage of a statute authorizing
enforcement of Section 2 in the future. Id. at 116. However, the census was deemed to be
inaccurate and the Congress chose to ignore it. Id. Since that time no other Congress has
attempted to produce a census reporting the number of disenfranchised citizens in the states.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 116.
152.
152 F.2d 235 (4th Cir. 1945).
153.
Id. at 238; Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 130–31.
154.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 116–17; Compromise of 1877, HIST.,
http://www.history.com/topics/us-presidents/compromise-of-1877 (last updated Aug. 21,
2018).
155.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 117; Compromise of 1877, supra note 154.
156.
Zuckerman, supra note 150, at 117, 124.
157.
Chin, supra note 137, at 261–62.
158.
See id. at 261–62, 312.
159.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; Chin, supra note 137, at 262–63.
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may have occurred, as the Fourteenth Amendment reduces electoral and
congressional representation based on the disenfranchisement of votes,
regardless of the cause. 160 Unfortunately, the Electoral College was used as
a mechanism that deprives citizens of equal protection and disenfranchises
voters without consequence as a result of the Fifteenth Amendment. 161
VIII. WHY IS THE ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR THE
STATES BUT CONSTITUTIONAL IN CONNECTION WITH THE ELECTION OF THE
PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT?
The Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions in Reynolds v.
Sims, Gray v. Sanders, 163 and Bush v. Gore 164 highlight the constitutional
infirmity of the Electoral College. 165 In the Reynolds and Gray decisions, the
Supreme Court ruled that state law which provides for an Electoral College
style of voting to choose a state’s Executive was unconstitutional, even
though the Electoral College is still in existence today. 166
In Gray, the Supreme Court struck down a unit voting system used
by Georgia for all statewide offices. 167 In that system, a governor or senator
would win a unit in any county in which they won a majority. 168 Whoever
won the most units would win their election. 169 The Court found that the
foregoing system was unconstitutional because votes for a losing candidate
in a particular county were not counted. 170 The Court held the electoral style
voting system violated Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
gave an unfair weight to votes for the winning candidate in a particular
county. 171
Georgia argued that its voting system was similar to the Electoral
College for the presidency. 172 However, the Supreme Court rejected that
162

160.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; Chin, supra note 137, at 259–60, 263.
161.
Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 377 n.8 (1963); Michael J. O’Sullivan,
Artificial Unit Voting and the Electoral College, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2421, 2435–36 (1992);
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
162.
377 U.S. 533 (1964).
163.
372 U.S. 368 (1963).
164.
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
165.
See id. at 104; Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 587; Gray, 372 U.S. at 378.
166.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 585–87; Gray, 372 U.S. at 381; see also Jeffrey W.
Ladewig, One Person, One Vote, 435 Seats: Interstate Malapportionment and Constitutional
Requirements, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1125, 1138 (2011); O’Sullivan, supra note 161, at 2435–36.
167.
Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
168.
Id. at 371.
169.
Id. at 372.
170.
See id. at 379–81.
171.
Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
172.
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 370–71.
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argument and noted that, because the Electoral College was established by
Article II of the Constitution, it was entitled to special protection,
distinguishing it from Georgia’s Electoral College system. 173
It is
counterintuitive to think the Constitution requires Georgia to disperse its
gubernatorial votes equally among the members of the governor’s natural
constituency, but it does not require the Electoral College to disperse
electoral votes as equally as possible among the members of the President’s
natural constituency. 174 Nonetheless, and despite the fact that Georgia’s
system was nearly identical to the Electoral College, the Court found that it
was constitutionally required to uphold one system but not the other. 175
Similarly, in Reynolds, the Supreme Court once again used the Equal
Protection Clause to impose the one person, one vote doctrine on state
legislatures. 176 The Court reiterated:
To the extent that a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that
much less a citizen. The fact that an individual lives here or there
is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy
of his vote. The complexions of societies and civilizations change,
often with amazing rapidity. A nation once primarily rural in
character becomes predominantly urban. Representation schemes
once fair and equitable become archaic and outdated. But the
basic principle of representative government remains, and must
remain, unchanged—the weight of a citizen’s vote cannot be made
to depend on where he lives. Population is, of necessity, the
starting point for consideration and the controlling criterion for
judgment in legislative apportionment controversies. 177

In both Reynolds and Gray, the Supreme Court of the United States
held that an Electoral College system of voting for state officials was
unconstitutional because it violated the one person, one vote doctrine of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 178
Like in Reynolds and Gray, in Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court
found that Florida’s system of selecting electors violated the Equal
Protection Clause. 179 In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court addressed whether
the Equal Protection Clause prevented a recount of the Florida vote during
173.
See id. at 376–78; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
174.
See Gray, 372 U.S. at 388 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
175.
Id. at 376–78.
176.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964); Ladewig, supra note 166, at 1136.
177.
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 567.
178.
Id. at 586–87; see also Gray, 372 U.S. at 381.
179.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109–10 (2000); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586–87;
Gray, 372 U.S. at 376–78.
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the 2000 presidential election. 180 Under the circumstances presented by the
facts in Bush v. Gore, Florida election law mandated a recount in the
counties for state electors who were elected under Florida state election
laws. 181
The Supreme Court found that, because Florida’s procedure for
recounting votes for their electors was not being uniformly conducted, it
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 182
Despite the fact that each county had a different ballot and different voting
machines, the Supreme Court found that the recount procedures utilized by
the Florida Legislature did not provide “the minimum procedures necessary
to protect the fundamental right of each voter” to have his vote counted in
the same manner as other similarly situated voters. 183 Thus, the Supreme
Court found that, where different counties are being treated differently with
respect to the re-tabulation of individual votes in connection with the
selection of electors, there was an equal protection violation.184 In making
its determination, the Supreme Court ignored the fact that different voters in
different states, using different voting mechanisms, had already been
subjected to equal protection violations—such as the violation described in
Reynolds. 185
As further evidence of the constitutional infirmity of the Electoral
College, a coalition led by David Boies, of Boies Schiller Flexner and the
League of Latin American Citizens, have filed lawsuits in Massachusetts,
California, South Carolina, and Texas, challenging the system enacted by
those states to select their electors. 186 The concern expressed in the lawsuit
is exacerbated by the fact that in 2020, a significant number of immigrants
may not be part of the census, further diminishing the voting power of more
urban states. 187 Although the foregoing lawsuits may have the effect of
modifying how the Electoral College is implemented on a state by state
180.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
181.
Id.; Mitchell W. Berger & Candice D. Tobin, Election 2000: The Law of
Tied Presidential Elections, 26 NOVA L. REV. 647, 675–76 (2002).
182.
Bush, 531 U.S. at 110.
183.
Id. at 109.
184.
Id. at 109–10.
185.
See id. at 105, 109; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 540–41 (1964).
186.
Legal Team Led by LULAC and David Boies File Lawsuits Challenging
Winner-Take-All Approach to Selecting Electors in Presidential Elections, LULAC,
http://www.lulac.org/news/pr/LULAC_File_Lawsuits_Challenging_Winner-TakeAll_Approach/ (last visited May 1, 2019); Bill Whalen, Go Ahead and Change the Electoral
College, but There’s Still a Trump Presidency, FORBES (Aug. 12, 2018, 7:52 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/billwhalen/2018/08/12/go-ahead-and-the-change-the-electoralcollege-but-theres-still-a-trump-presidency/.
187.
Paul Hond, Ballot Breakdown, COLUM. MAG., Fall 2018, at 28, 35.
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basis, it is unclear as to whether they will cause a change in how the
Electoral College system is operated nationally in light of Bush v. Gore.188
Other proposed solutions to the winner-take-all system of the Electoral
College, such as agreements among states to select electors based on who
wins the majority of the popular vote, are also unlikely to result in a national
change in the Electoral College either. 189
IX.

IS THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE BIASED?

The Electoral College gives some states a disproportional level of
representation in the presidential election. 190 To illustrate, in 2016, “[i]n
Wyoming, one electoral vote represented 72,000 ballots cast by actual
citizens,” while in California, the same electoral vote represented 270,000
actual votes, “giving a Wyoming citizen nearly four times more power than a
California citizen in allocating votes from the Electoral College.”191
By way of example, as a result of the Electoral College, “Donald
Trump won Pennsylvania and Florida by a combined margin of about
200,000 votes to earn 49 electoral votes. Hillary Clinton, meanwhile, won
188.
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 109; Legal Team Led by LULAC and David Boies
File Lawsuits Challenging Winner-Take-All Approach to Selecting Electors in Presidential
Elections, supra note 186. Bush v. Gore provided, in relevant part, that it was not to be
considered binding precedent. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109. “Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances.” Id.
189.
See Ethan J. Leib & Eli J. Mark, Democratic Principle and Electoral
College Reform, 106 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 105, 105–06 (2007). “In 2007
Maryland passed the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, . . . a law that obliges the
state’s . . . electors to vote for the winner of the nationwide popular vote . . . so long as states
representing an overall majority of the [E]lectoral [C]ollege have approved an identical bill.”
America’s Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats, supra note
10. To date, twelve democratic states and the District of Columbia have adopted the bill.
Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NAT’L POPULAR VOTE INC.,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited May 1, 2019). The bill also
passed both legislative chambers in New Mexico and Delaware. Id. Further, in Michigan, a
bipartisan group of senators introduced Senate Bill 1117, joining the compact. See S.B. 1117,
99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018).
190.
See id.
In 1988, for example, the combined . . . population, 3,119,000, of the seven least
populous jurisdictions of Alaska, Delaware, the District of Columbia, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming carried the same voting strength in
the Electoral College [twenty-one] Electoral votes as the 9,614,000 persons . . . in
the State of Florida.

WILLIAM C. KIMBERLING, NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE ELECTORAL
COLLEGE 1, 11 (1992).
191.
William H. Chafe, One Person, One Vote Is a Myth, NEWS & OBSERVER:
OP-ED (Dec. 21, 2016, 10:40 PM), http://www.newsobserver.com/opinion/oped/article122328279.html.
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Massachusetts by almost a million votes but earned only 11 electoral
votes.” 192 Similarly, “Clinton won California by over 3 million votes,
netting 55 electoral votes. [President] Trump’s combined popular vote
margin in Pennsylvania, Florida, Michigan, and Wisconsin was under
250,000, but those victories netted him 75 electoral votes.” 193
The Electoral College favors Republican candidates—candidates
who are generally favored by rural, less populated regions, giving them a
head start in the election process. 194 There are eleven states where the
“support for the [Republican party] outstrips support for the Democratic
party by at least [ten] percent. These states have [sixty-five] percent more
representation in the Electoral College than . . . if . . . votes were distributed
evenly.” 195 The existence of a Republican bias in the Electoral College is
further supported by the fact that the past two Republican Presidents, George
W. Bush and Donald J. Trump, lost the popular election by five hundred
thousand and almost three million votes respectively, but were elected
President thanks to the Electoral College. 196 Indeed, in 2000,
[H]ad there not been a two-seat bonus for senatorial seats, even
with a [President] Bush victory in Florida, a 435 seat Electoral
College—without D.C.—would have elected Gore by a margin of
224–211 (51.9%), while a 436 seat Electoral College—with
D.C.—would have elected Gore by a margin of 225–211
192.
Robert Speel, Three Common Arguments for Preserving the Electoral
College — and Why They’re Wrong, CONVERSATION (Nov. 14, 2016, 9:55 PM),
http://www.theconversation.com/three-common-arguments-for-preserving-the-electoralcollege-and-why-theyre-wrong-68546.
193.
Sean Darling-Hammond, The Electoral College Is Even More Biased than
You Think.
But Democrats Can Beat It., NATION (Jan. 19, 2017),
http://www.thenation.com/article/the-electoral-college-is-even-more-biased-than-you-thinkheres-how-democrats-can-beat-it/.
194.
See American Democracy’s Built-In Bias, ECONOMIST (London), July 14,
2018, at 16. “Places where people live close together vote Democratic, places where they live
farther apart vote Republican, . . . [and] nearly half the variance in the county-level vote
shares in the presidential election of 2016 could be explained solely by their number of voters
per square kilome[ter].” The Minority Majority, ECONOMIST, July 14, 2018, at 21, 22.
Candidates from the Republican party have 191 projected electoral votes from Southern and
other conservative-leaning States without even having to campaign in those states. Nate
Silver, Why a Plan to Circumvent the Electoral College Is Probably Doomed,
POL.
(Apr.
17,
2014,
5:49
PM),
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT:
http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-a-plan-to-circumvent-the-electoral-college-isprobably-doomed/.
195.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 193.
196.
See id.; Drew Desilver, Trump’s Victory Another Example of How
Electoral College Wins Are Bigger than Popular Vote Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/12/20/why-electoral-college-landslides-areeasier-to-win-than-popular-vote-ones/.
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(51.6%)—which was used to argue that that the Electoral College
now has a—small—built-in bias toward the Republicans based
solely on greater Republican strength in the smaller states. 197

Since 1977, Republicans have appointed ten United States Supreme
Court Justices compared to four which were appointed by Democrats, yet
without the Electoral College, there would be eight Democratic Supreme
Court appointees compared to only six Republican ones. 198 Because these
judges are appointed by politicians, the Electoral College “embeds this rural
bias in the courts as well.” 199
In addition, Southern States, the majority of which have voted for a
Republican President since 2000, receive significantly more benefits than
their Northern counterparts. 200

197.
Bernard Grofman & Scott L. Feld, Thinking About the Political Impacts of
the Electoral College, 123 PUB. CHOICE 1, 3 (2005).
198.
Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789–Present, FED.
JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advancedsearch (last visited May 1,
2019); see also American Democracy’s Built-In Bias, supra note 194. The Republican party
will soon be appointing an eleventh Supreme Court Justice. See American Democracy’s
Built-In Bias, supra note 194.
199.
Id.
200.
See id.; Toni Monkovic, 50 Years of Electoral College Maps: How the
U.S. Turned Red and Blue, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/upshot/50-years-of-electoral-college-maps-how-the-usturned-red-and-blue.html. Part of the favoritism could be caused by the fact that as of the
census of 2010, “the five most rural states wielded about [fifty percent] more electoral votes,
and three times as many senators, per resident as the five most urban ones did.” America’s
Electoral System Gives the Republicans Advantages over Democrats, supra note 10.
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As set forth in the tables above, Southern States received
approximately $25,441,931,402 more in federal aid than they paid in
taxes. 201 Western and Midwestern States, which are similarly more rural
than the Northeastern States, received $6,881,823,032 and $5,584,135,059
more than they paid in taxes respectively, as well. 202 Thus, in the South,
citizens received, in 2016, on an average per capita basis $4,425 per year
more than they paid in taxes, which is nearly double what citizens in Western
States received, $2,789, on average per capita and nearly ten times what
citizens in the Northeast, $516, and Midwest, $569, received on average on a
per capita basis, in 2016, in exchange for the taxes they paid. 203 This means
that the federal government pays approximately $6,982,535,112 on average
201.
202.
203.

See infra app. A.
See infra app. A.
See infra app. A.
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to Southern States per elector, while spending $5,480,817,164 per elector in
the Northeastern States, and $5,124,592,838 per elector in the Midwest. 204
The politicized nature of the Electoral College has further decreased
equal political activity and participation amongst states. 205 If a candidate is
likely to win in one state, then that candidate will not spend much time there,
enabling him to spend time in swing states, or states where the population
demographics are diverse, creating uncertainty with respect to how that
state’s electors will vote. 206 In fact, in 2012, the swing states—Ohio, New
Hampshire, Colorado, Florida, Virginia, Nevada, Iowa, Wisconsin, and
Pennsylvania—“collectively had a 98.6 percent chance of determining the
Electoral College winner in 2012,” making these nine states seventy times
more powerful with respect to the presidential election “than the other [fortyone], which collectively had a 1.4 percent chance of determining the winner
combined.” 207 As a result, candidates spend more time in those states. 208
Data from the 2016 campaign shows that:
[Fifty-three] percent of campaign events for [President] Trump,
Hillary Clinton, Mike Pence, and Tim Kaine in the two months
before the November election were in only four states: Florida,
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Ohio. During that time, 87
percent of campaign visits by the four candidates were in [twelve]
battleground states, and none of the four candidates ever went to
[twenty-seven] states, which includes almost all of rural
America. 209

Not only do swing states receive more attention in campaigns, but
they also receive significantly more funding. 210 In fact, the gross average
federal spending in the swing states is $6,517,873,233 per electoral vote
compared to $5,659,705,613 per electoral vote in non-swing states. 211
Despite the fact that the Electoral College has caused significant disparate
treatment amongst the states, it is still being used today. 212

204.
See infra app. A.
205.
See Strömberg, supra note 5, at 786.
206.
Id. at 781, 786. For example, in 2000, California was forecasted to have a
fifty-two percent democratic vote share and a fifty-five percent democratic vote share in 2004.
Id. at 781. As a result, much less attention was given to California in 2000 than in 2004. Id.
207.
Silver, supra note 194.
208.
See Strömberg, supra note 5, at 790.
209.
Speel, supra note 192.
210.
See Strömberg, supra note 5, at 786, 798; infra app. A.
211.
See infra app. A.
212.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 193.
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CONCLUSION

Like an infected appendix, the Electoral College serves no legitimate
purpose and must be removed. 213 It was originally intended to create a
federal government, which included Southern slaveholding States by
allowing slave owners to have a disproportionate say in the Electoral College
compared to those permitted to vote, in exchange for the right to tax them
based on their slaves. 214
The compromise was carried over from
congressional representatives and is now being used to allow rural, lesspopulated states to have a disproportionate say in the election of the
Executive. 215 Those states already exercise a sufficient veto over the more
populated states by way of the unequal representation in the Senate, and in
some instances, the House of Representatives. 216 If the Executive continues
to consistently fall into the hands of the candidate receiving less votes than
their opponent, as has been the case in 2000 and 2016, and those casting less
votes continue to disproportionately receive greater say in judicial
appointments, the majority should take action to eliminate the Electoral
College in the Twenty-First Century, considering the significant impact that
the Electoral College has on federal spending, as well.217
The best mechanism to remedy the problem caused by the Electoral
College is the enactment of a constitutional amendment eliminating the
Electoral College and replacing it with a direct election of the Executive. 218
Direct election would ensure that the Executive is a person of the people,
consistent with the values of a modern democracy. 219 Moreover, the
historical justifications of the Electoral College—the need to protect small
states’ interests or, originally, the interests of slave owners in rural states—
no longer exist; slavery and its vestiges were supposed to be abolished
through the Thirteenth Amendment, which was to be enforced through the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 220 Although the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments should have ensured that there is not a
disproportionate treatment of people in connection with the Electoral
College, those amendments, because of our post-civil war history, never fully
213.
Amar, supra note 109; Silver, supra note 194.
214.
See WILLS, supra note 38, at 6.
215.
Darling-Hammond, supra note 193.
216.
Id.
217.
See id.; Desilver, supra note 196.
218.
See Amar, supra note 109.
219.
Id.
220.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; Amar, supra note 37, at 471; Carter, supra
note 124, at 1347–48; Constitutional Topic: The Constitutional Convention, supra note 18;
Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1154–56; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST.
amend. XV.
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accomplished their purpose. 221 The rural land mass and small states with less
population will still exercise a sufficient check over the majority through the
Senate. 222
The Electoral College should be eliminated. 223 The time to excise
the infected appendix is now. 224

221.
Carter, supra note 124, at 1368 n.210; Finkelman, supra note 19, at 1156;
see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XV. One interesting alternative is
to use a ranked-choice voting system, where “voters list candidates in order of preference.
After a first count, the candidate with the least support is eliminated, and his or her [voters]
are reallocated to those voters’ second choice. This continues until someone has a majority.”
American Democracy’s Built-In Bias, supra note 194.
222.
See The Small-State Advantage in the United States Senate, N.Y. TIMES:
POL.
(Mar.
10,
2013),
http://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/11/us/politics/small-stateadvantage.html.
223.
See Tyler Lewis, Why We Should Abolish the Electoral College,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 12, 2016, 4:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tyler-lewis/why-weshould-abolish-the_1_b_8961256.html. “Although he has vacillated on the institution,
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Appendix A – Electoral College Model

Swing
State

Census
Region

U.S.
State

Non-swing

South

AL

33,881,189,324

6,967

5

Non-swing

West

AK

3,489,076,519

4,703

11

Non-swing

West

AZ

29,124,597,576

4,202

13

Non-swing

South

AR

13,852,243,174

4,636

12

Non-swing

West

CA

(6,359,640,090)

(162)

39

Swing

West

CO

2,404,289,383

434

35

Non-swing

Northeast

CT

(7,739,471,054)

(2,164)

48

Non-swing

South

DE

499,543,573

525

33

Non-swing

South

D.C.

37,553,107,729

55,130

X

Swing

South

FL

60,660,393,037

3,943

22

Non-swing

South

GA

26,712,213,596

2,591

24

Non-swing

West

HI

9,619,388,984

6,734

6

Non-swing

West

ID

6,677,694,565

3,967

16

Non-swing

Midwest

IL

(16,761,147,441)

(1,309)

43

Non-swing

Midwest

IN

13,610,322,910

2,052

28

Swing

Midwest

IA

3,026,815,364

966

31

Non-swing

Midwest

KS

1,451,182,678

499

34

Non-swing

South

KY

27,900,047,223

6,288

8

Non-swing

South

LA

14,572,253,433

3,113

21

Non-swing

Northeast

ME

7,816,056,654

5,870

9

Non-swing

South

MD

39,515,351,186

6,568

7

Non-swing

Northeast

MA

(12,563,198,372)

(1,844)

45

Non-swing

Midwest

MI

25,848,002,229

2,603

23

Non-swing

Midwest

MN

(7,600,361,450)

(1,377)

44

Non-swing

South

MS

21,766,950,868

7,283

3

Non-swing

Midwest

MO

25,183,266,825

4,133

14

Non-swing

West

MT

3,669,092,613

3,519

18

Non-swing

Midwest

NE

(995,851,610)

(522)

41
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Population

Electoral
Votes (EV)

Votes/1M
Population

Gross Fed
Spending

Gross Fed
Spending/Person

Gross Fed
Spending/EV

4,863,300

9

1.85

65,983,068,864

13,568

7,331,452,096

741,894

3

4.04

11,157,856,782

15,040

3,719,285,594

6,931,071

11

1.59

78,229,597,927

11,287

7,111,781,630

2,988,248

6

2.01

33,924,912,852

11,353

5,654,152,142

39,250,017

55

1.40

407,006,802,740

10,370

7,400,123,686

5,540,545

9

1.62

57,551,189,375

10,387

6,394,576,597

3,576,452

7

1.96

49,669,485,830

13,888

7,095,640,833

952,065

3

3.15

10,679,952,890

11,218

3,559,984,297

681,170

3

4.40

48,990,201,991

71,921

16,330,067,330

20,612,439

29

1.41

235,914,265,299

11,445

8,134,974,665

10,310,371

16

1.55

106,960,628,616

10,374

6,685,039,288

1,428,557

4

2.80

21,000,160,331

14,700

5,250,040,083

1,683,140

4

2.38

17,234,269,332

10,239

4,308,567,333

12,801,539

20

1.56

120,239,483,639

9,393

6,011,974,182

6,633,053

11

1.66

65,306,761,478

9,846

5,936,978,316

3,134,693

6

1.91

29,063,858,276

9,272

4,843,976,379

2,907,289

6

2.06

27,705,171,964

9,530

4,617,528,661

4,436,974

8

1.80

57,088,361,766

12,867

7,136,045,221

4,681,666

8

1.71

50,569,747,712

10,802

6,321,218,564

1,331,479

4

3.00

17,297,790,512

12,991

4,324,447,628

6,016,447

10

1.66

104,966,019,555

17,447

10,496,601,955

6,811,779

11

1.61

80,366,233,804

11,798

7,306,021,255

9,928,300

16

1.61

107,485,248,203

10,826

6,717,828,013

5,519,952

10

1.81

51,846,731,659

9,393

5,184,673,166

2,988,726

6

2.01

38,374,253,268

12,840

6,395,708,878

6,093,000

10

1.64

73,604,892,841

12,086

7,364,089,284

1,042,520

3

2.88

11,351,822,748

10,889

3,783,940,916

1,907,116

5

2.62

17,219,642,103

9,029

3,443,928,421
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Swing
State

Census
Region

U.S.
State

Swing

West

NV

4,454,455,602

1,515

30

Swing

Northeast

NH

(855,204,488)

(641)

42

Non-swing

Northeast

NJ

(27,509,105,476)

(3,076)

50

Non-swing

West

NM

20,172,131,492

9,693

1

Non-swing

Northeast

NY

(40,871,429,785)

(2,070)

47

Non-swing

South

NC

32,293,429,847

3,183

20

Non-swing

Midwest

ND

(1,795,452,676)

(2,369)

49

Swing

Midwest

OH

23,144,198,358

1,993

29

Non-swing

South

OK

13,639,334,449

3,476

19

Non-swing

West

OR

9,850,959,730

2,407

25

Swing

Northeast

PA

27,319,492,370

2,137

27

Non-swing

Northeast

RI

2,532,067,609

2,397

26

Non-swing

South

SC

26,463,810,527

5,271

10

Non-swing

Midwest

SD

(170,389,496)

(197)

40

Non-swing

South

TN

23,463,810,527

3,528

17

Non-swing

South

TX

(1,771,144,694)

(64)

38

Non-swing

West

UT

965,144,473

316

37

Non-swing

Northeast

VT

2,522,204,333

4,038

15

Swing

South

VA

60,587,009,281

7,203

4

Non-swing

West

WA

6,551,639,674

899

32

Non-swing

South

WV

13,348,485,458

7,290

2

Swing

Midwest

WI

2,069,035,012

358

36

Non-swing

West

WY

(1,155,131,107)

(1,973)

46

Total Spending
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Population

Electoral
Votes

Votes/1M
Population

2,940,058

6

2.04

1,334,795

4

8,944,469

Gross Fed
Spending/Person

Gross Fed
Spending/EV

28,482,677,176

9,688

4,747,112,863

3.00

14,283,701,422

10,701

3,570,925,355

14

1.57

88,987,259,328

9,949

6,356,232,809

2,081,015

5

2.40

33,037,900,799

15,876

6,607,580,160

19,745,289

29

1.47

214,124,006,387

10,844

7,383,586,427

10,146,788

15

1.48

108,619,980,655

10,705

7,241,332,044

757,952

3

3.96

7,199,445,717

9,499

2,399,815,239

11,614,373

18

1.55

119,955,556,555

10,328

6,664,197,586

3,923,465

7

1.78

43,814,699,106

11,167

6,259,242,729

4,093,465

7

1.71

43,036,724,519

10,514

6,148,103,503

12,784,227

20

1.56

150,141,568,554

11,744

7,507,078,428

1,056,426

4

3.79

12,707,098,112

12,028

3,176,774,528

4,961,119

9

1.81

58,436,605,411

11,779

6,492,956,157

865,454

3

3.47

8,781,546,721

10,147

2,927,182,240

6,651,194

11

1.65

74,144,673,351

11,148

6,740,424,850

27,862,596

38

1.36

264,266,982,768

9,485

6,954,394,283

3,051,217

6

1.97

22,691,867,727

7,437

3,781,977,955

624,594

3

4.80

7,819,941,645

12,520

2,606,647,215

8,411,808

13

1.55

148,395,970,439

17,641

11,415,074,649

7,288,000

12

1.65

83,785,682,678

11,496

6,982,140,223

1,831,102

5

2.73

24,509,800,398

13,385

4,901,960,080

5,778,708

10

1.73

53,829,425,727

9,315

5,382,942,573

585,501

3

5.12

5,791,585,048

9,892

1,930,529,349

Total Gross Spending
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